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Both here, on the blog itself, and on Phoronix, this title is so bad I wonder the original author actually thought. In my personal opinion, the actual title should have been "Postgres 19 is late, and we're thankful to AI for all the bug fixes".
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"...And there was some very exciting work on various performance improvements, to allow much faster switching between applications and their system services. But I will let the team tell you all the technical details..." I don't suppose you can write an OS in Rust then at the same time claim to care about micro-optimization? Also, I'm confused here. I wasn't here in the older days but I believe that back then in the older days, microkernel was actually a reasonable design for a kernel. Back…
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Some of the reverted ones at least are not fancy. Temporal DB support is a standard way of doing what is being done ad-hoc in application code N different ways. Property graph queries some could argue at the very least is fancy, GROUP BY ALL and online disabling DB-level data checksums really aren't. A few others are optimisations.
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MPTCP is just the only publicized exploitation path, there could be others.
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For the CalDAV testing - I wonder if the KDE folk are aware of Calconnect, the organisation that drove much of the standards setting. There website has a wealth of information there which looks to have recently been tidied up even though I believe Calconnect itself is pretty quiet at the moment. When I worked at Scalix and then Zimbra, we used to go to Calconnect conferences (and meetings in between) where a good mix of client and server vendors would work on the standards and do interop…
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It also might not end up so bad in the end. As far as I understand, all of these large features that were reverted for PG19 were originally written before AI tools were considered nearly as effective as they are today. Perhaps new features that are only just starting development will have more bugs found as part of development and thus arrive more robust.
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You generally get one of 3 options. 1 - don't offer the feature 2 - offer the feature but do janky workarounds for the platforms that don't have it 3 - require code to do things to explicitly opt into the platform specific feature None of them feels great when it's an important feature.
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I know it's a bit problematic with stuff getting into production that shouldn't, but can't you have a module within the library that's clearly development? Basically things that people want, that need testing, and are likely to change. Everything in there would be _syscalld{1,{2,{3...}}} (and could possibly scream at the log when it's called). So people *can* use it, and once it's finalised and goes live, all the _syscalld stuff would get dropped (or possibly #define'd to the proper syscall…
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the entire ARM platform is a mess
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Because Red Hat and SUSE provide security fixes for years and because their customers don't push insecure non-upstream crap onto billions of consumers, for example. Whereas with basically all non-Pixel phones (perhaps some of the flagship Samsungs?) unless you buy them close to the time they come out you risk having no security updates after 2 years.
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. . . at least for the newer versions - I can say for sure about the 6.12.y branch, and given it goes back to the 4.4 kernel I'd be surprised if it hasn't been backported to all the active LTS releases. The backported fix in the 6.12.y branch is: commit 11a03ce3c4a62d84c10ccdfe47f8075006498568 Author: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@kernel.org> Date: Thu Oct 1 22:12:53 2026 +0000 ipv4: free inet_opt and ireq_opt after an RCU grace period commit e3f33b0a1d89d738e2b913dab519226eaf76e15b upstream. The RCE…
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> Google could, at any time, require Android OEMs to update their kernels more frequently. Or even just to update stable kernel versions. But Google doesn’t want to. Other distributions like RHEL and SLES don't either. Is there a particular reason to single out Google here?
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Thank you for the additional information.
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Thank you for the insight. This is why I love to read LWN.net comments.
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I compile my own kernel packages and the sysctl command you gave failed. So I checked: $ grep -i mptcp /boot/config-7.3.1 # CONFIG_MPTCP is not set I guess I'm accidentally safe.
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This is bad. I was able to build a POC crash generator in about an hour with Claude. Presumably, a full RCE is only a bit more tricky. I've updated everything I could, and set a rule on my firewalls to drop any TCP SYN packets that have any IPv4 options enabled. And I'm already seeing this rule activating.
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Google could, at any time, require Android OEMs to update their kernels more frequently. Or even just to update stable kernel versions. But Google doesn’t want to.
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Python has had truststore since May 5, 2022 And that works with python 3.10 and newer
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For the (large) subset of things that are standardized and ABI-defined, yes, but if there's e.g. an __attribute__((packed)) on a struct, using the same version of clang for your C compiler and for bindgen (in the form of libclang) can be expected to get it right, and there is no such expectation if it's two different compilers. And of course if you do something like enable a layout-changing plugin in GCC like randstruct, then this will definitely not work (though Kconfig prevents that…
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This is a common pattern I have seen in both video game decompilation and porting scenes (see r/decomp and the closing of decomp.dev), the console hacking/homebrew scene (people vibe coding Switch 2 homebrew for Twitter likes), and now here. People use their AI agents to make their "product" and "consoom" them. These people are trying to do something that makes them "famous". Spoiler alert: it won't get them famous. I'm not going to link my a long post I made about this, but essentially, I've…
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It's basically everything that has a listener. You need to either update the kernel or turn off the MPTCP: sysctl -w net.mptcp.enabled=0
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The vulnerability is in the kernel, not in Go, Go just happens to be a (common) user of MPTCP. If your kernel isn't up to date, then anything (bash scripts?) using MPTCP is vulnerable.
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> workaround for the current lack of Rust support in GCC: they are building the C side of the kernel with GCC, and the Rust side with LLVM. This isn't a workaround, it's entirely normal. The C ABI is the same between GCC and LLVM. The only downside I'm aware of is that you can't do cross-language LTO this way.
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I understand the appeal for adding more and more features, but in a database, stability is absolutely critical. If Postgres 19 comes out with less new fancy features but far higher quality, that's a huge "selling" point in my mind. And I don't know about Postgres' policies, but you're not limited to using AI just to find bugs, it can also be used to fix them, write tests, etc. That'd be of help with the catching up.
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Exactly where a warning can save a lot of time. Logging wasn't part of this discussion at all? Disappointing. Interestingly, the choice of the logging level for a given statement is not an exact science either - just like error handling. Because they're both about an uncertain future. One of reasons to want to keep a system limping instead of dying is: more chance to collect more forensics while still limping. This is another way logging and error handling are connected to each other.
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Go uses Multipath TCP by default. There's *lots* of stuff that is written in Go that offers network services over TCP... including big ones like Kubernetes. Is there any centralized resource to see at a glance which network-facing projects are vulnerable and which version has a fix? Thanks.
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Thank you very much for the important information that Go uses multipath by default - because otherwise I'd have assumed that nothing I'm running uses MP.
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Yes, it'll be a slot just like everything else. You can turn it on and create nested cells that cannot get anything more than the cell creating it. You can turn it off and then nesting is disallowed. I don't think I have it in the Git tree right now but it's in my local branch that I'm working on.
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https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/DSA-6568-1 (linux package 6.12.113-1)
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Yes, it is. The next longest is this one from 2022, which has 387 alerts to this one's 424. The longest weekly summary was from back in April, with 783 entries, although this week's weekly table might be able to beat it if there are more security updates over the weekend.